Abstract: The vulnerability of biometric systems to external attacks using a physical artefact in order to impersonate the legitimate user has become a major concern over the last decade. Such a threat, commonly known as 'spoofing', poses a serious risk to the integrity of biometric systems. The usual low-complexity and low-cost characteristics of these attacks make them accessible to the general public, rendering each user a potential intruder. The present study addresses the spoofing issue analysing the feasibility to perform low-cost attacks with self-manufactured three-dimensional (3D) printed models to 2.5D and 3D face recognition systems. A new database with 2D, 2.5D and 3D real and fake data from 26 subjects was acquired for the experiments. Results showed the high vulnerability of the three tested systems, including a commercial solution, to the attacks.
Introduction
In recent decades, we have witnessed the evolution of biometric technology from the first pioneering works in face and voice recognition to the current state of development where a wide spectrum of highly accurate systems may be found, ranging from largely deployed modalities such as face, fingerprint or iris, to more marginal ones such as signature or hand. This path of technological evolution has naturally led to a critical issue that only recently has started to be addressed: the robustness of this rapidly emerging technology to external attacks and, in particular, to 'spoofing'.
Spoofing refers to the ability to fool biometric applications by means of presenting to the sensor a manufactured artefact (e.g. face photograph or gummy finger) in order to impersonate a different user, and has become a major concern among the specialised community. As a consequence, nowadays spoofing is a very active field of research which has promoted the appearance of: multiple research works [1-3]; Ph.D. Theses [4-6]; dedicated books [7] ; standards [8] ; public funded projects [9] ; specific tracks in international conferences [10, 11] ; and even international competitions which seek to evaluate the performance of countermeasures [12] [13] [14] .
One of the main reasons for which spoofing has attracted a lot of interest is its 'do-it-yourself' dimension. It is well known that absolute security does not exist: given enough funding, willpower and the proper technology, every security system can be compromised. In this context, the objective of security experts is to develop applications such that the funding, the will and the resources needed by the attacker to bypass them, prevent him from attempting to do so. For this reason, protection measures are usually developed first for low-cost, simple, low-tech attacks that are accessible to the general public. Unfortunately, it has already been shown in a significant number of occasions that spoofing falls within this category of easy-to-perform attacks [15] [16] [17] . Such a 'public' or 'non-technological' nature of spoofing has thrown not only researchers but also users and vendors, to the search of new spoofing-related vulnerabilities and the proposal of innovative anti-spoofing solutions.
In particular, the face modality has been one of the most active biometrics in the field of spoofing. A long way has been covered from the first works studying the robustness of two-dimensional (2D) face recognition to attacks carried out with simple hard-copy impressions of the genuine user's face image [18] . In fact, nowadays, the latest developments involve sophisticated mask attacks carried out with 3D face models [19, 20] . A big contribution to such significant progress has been the acquisition and distribution of public databases where researchers can objectively evaluate novel protection techniques [21, 22] . Several of these databases have been acquired in the context of international competitions which have also boosted the development of technological innovation to counterfeit spoofing [12, 23] .
However, in spite of the evident advances that have been reached, more evolved and sophisticated attacking techniques continue to appear for which new protection solutions are needed. In this continuous and relentless race between protection and attack methods, it is essential to keep track of the rapid technological progress, since some of the advances can be the key to discover new vulnerabilities or to propose novel countermeasures.
For instance, in the field of face spoofing, there is still not enough understanding of the potential risk posed by mask attacks, where the intruder tries to illegally access the system using a 3D model of the genuine user's face. In part, the scarcity of research addressing this potential threat has been because of the technical and economic difficulty posed by the generation of databases of realistic masks. However, these obstacles have been significantly lessened in recent times with the appearance of some companies where such 3D face models may be ordered (http://www.thatsmyface.com; https://shapify.me; and http://www.sculpteo.com). Furthermore, self-manufacturing a face model is also becoming more feasible and easier each day with the new generation of affordable 3D acquisition sensors (http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinect and http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PrimeSense), dedicated scanning software (http://www.skanect.com; http://www.kscan3d.com; and http://www.fablitec.com) and the price decrease of 3D printing devices (http://www.sharebot.it/ and http://www.cubify.com). Such 3D printing technology has already been used within the field of biometrics to increase the accuracy of fingerprint-based recognition technology through the generation of 3D printed phantom fingerprints [24] .
In addition to the above-mentioned new spoofing possibilities given by the latest technical advances, other open problems remain largely unexplored in the field of face spoofing. For instance, even though the vulnerabilities of 2D face systems are quite well known, very few researches have been yet carried out on the spoofability of 3D and 2.5D face recognition technology.
Motivated by the current spoofing context presented above, where many open questions remain, the current work provides a comprehensive study on the feasibility to spoof 3D and 2.5D face recognition systems with low-cost self-manufactured models. The models have been produced taking advantage of the newly available and affordable off-the-shelf 3D sensing, processing and printing technology. The article reports a systematic and rigorous evaluation of the real risk posed by such attacking approach on a newly acquired spoofing database. In particular, the contributions of the work can be summarised as follows: † First vulnerability study of 3D and 2.5D face recognition systems to spoofing attacks carried out with low-cost self-manufactured 3D printed models. † First assessment of a commercial 3D face recognition application to attacks carried out with 3D face reproductions. † Presentation of a new face spoofing database which contains 3D, 2.5D and 2D data acquired with two different 3D sensors. † Thorough review of the state of the art in face spoofing including a comprehensive classification of attacks. † This paper also gives some initial insight into the readiness of the new low-cost 3D sensing technology for face recognition purposes.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related works. The experimental protocol with its main three components: data, systems and experiments, is described in Section 3. Experimental results are reported in Section 4. Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 5.
Related works
The present section refers only to those works which are thematically closer to the objectives and contributions mentioned in Section 1, that is, to face spoofing. Accordingly, other works that may be found in the literature which are also related to this area, such as those strictly focused on face anti-spoofing, will not be addressed here.
The use of masks or facial disguises to avoid being recognised is a practice which has been observed for centuries in the vast majority of known civilisations. Following this trend, probably the most modern version of this long-going tradition to change oneself's physical appearance, is the use of plastic surgery, which is becoming more and more popular thanks to the availability of advanced technology, its affordable cost and the speed with which these procedures are now performed. Recently, it has been shown that, in spite of some efforts to develop specific algorithms robust to facial surgery changes [25] [26] [27] , the problem of recognising a person after undergoing this type of operations is still an open challenge for automatic face authentication systems [28] . Even without turning to irreversible treatments, some works have also shown that face-based biometric systems may be circumvented just by wearing regular make-up [29] .
The aforementioned techniques (i.e. face masks, plastic surgery and make-up) are usually used to hide the user's own identity (i.e. Bob denies being Bob) and not to perform an attack, in which Bob tries to impersonate John. However, it has recently been shown at a live demonstration in a biometric-dedicated conference that this security scenario could change, and that methods such as surgery or make-up may be successfully used to perform direct attacks. In this conference, a female intruder was able to access a face recognition system in the place of a male user just by wearing some adequate make-up [30] .
Apart from these still limited examples on the potential use of disguise techniques for spoofing purposes, the vast majority of face direct attacks reported in the literature may be classified in one of two groups, as shown in Fig. 1 , depending on whether the artefacts used are: (i) 2D surfaces (e.g. photo and video) which are successful against 2D face systems (see grey arrows in Fig. 1 ) or (ii) 3D volumes (e.g. masks) which may be used to attack 2D, 2.5D and 3D face recognition technologies. Such artefacts have been used to carry out three main types of attacks which present an increasing level of spoofing potential: † 2D photo attacks: These fraudulent access attempts are carried out presenting to the recognition system a photograph of the genuine user. The photograph may have been taken by the attacker using a digital camera or even retrieved from the Internet after the user himself uploaded it to one of the very popular online social networks available today [31] .
The image can then be printed on a paper (i.e. print attacks, which were the first to be systematically studied in the literature) or may be displayed on the screen of a digital device such as a mobile phone or a tablet (i.e. digital-photo attacks) [21, 23, 32] . A slightly more advanced type of photo-attack that has also been studied is the use of photographic masks. These masks are high-resolution printed photographs where eyes and mouth have been cut out. At the time of the attack the impostor is placed behind [18] , so that certain face movements such as eye blinking are reproduced. † 2D video attacks: Also referred in some cases as 'replay attacks'. They represent a more sophisticated version of the simple photo spoofs. In this case, the attacker does not use a still image but replays a video of the genuine client using a digital device (e.g. mobile phone, tablet or laptop) [22, 33] . Such attacks appeared as a further step in the evolution of face spoofing and are more difficult to detect, as not only the face 2D texture is copied but also its dynamics. This way, they are able to bypass countermeasures based on motion ques which are usually efficient against photo spoofs. † 3D mask attacks: In these cases, the spoofing artefact is a 3D mask of the genuine client's face, increasing the difficulty to find accurate countermeasures against them. Since the complete 3D structure of the face is imitated, the use of depth cues which could be a solution to prevent the previous two types of attacks (carried out with flat surfaces) becomes inefficient against this particular threat.
Although the possibility to bypass a biometric system wearing a mask imitating the face of a different user is an idea that has been circulating for some time [34] , these attacks are far less common than the previous two categories. Face-mask spoofing has only started to be systematically studied with the acquisition of the first mask-specific datasets [20, 35] , which include masks of different materials and sizes [19, 36] .
To date, the spoofing of 3D and 2.5D systems to mask attacks has only been addressed in [20] . However, in that work the authors rely on a third party to build the masks, reducing this way the 'do-it-yourself' dimension of other well-known spoofing attacks, and limiting to some extent their practical risk level. Furthermore, the database used in the experiments has not been released on any form, which limits the reproducibility of the results and its use for the development of future countermeasures.
All previous attacks have a number of variants depending on the resolution of the spoofing device, the type of support used to present the fake copy (e.g. handheld or fixed support) or the external variability allowed (e.g. illumination or background conditions). These different attack versions may be found in the face spoofing databases available for research [12, 20-23, 35, 37] . For a comparative summary of the most important features of current 3D-spoofing databases we refer the reader to Table 1 .
It is also worth highlighting that face recognition systems may also be subjected to attacks from identical twins claiming to be the same person. From a rigorous point of view, these are not spoofing attacks (as there is no physical artefact involved) but rather zero-effort impostor attempts, in which Bob presents his own biometric trait while trying to access the system as John. Therefore such a case is not strictly related to the current study and will not be considered in this paper. We refer the interested reader to some specific works on this topic to understand the implications and performance of face recognition systems in the presence of twins [38] [39] [40] [41] .
With respect to the related works mentioned above, the novelty of the present paper is mainly supported by three main contributions: † As mentioned in Section 1, extensive research has been carried out on the analysis of the robustness of 2D face-based biometric systems to spoofing attacks. However, up to date, only one previous study considered the 'spoofability' of 3D face recognition systems [20] . Although undoubtedly valuable that previous work presented some limitations that are addressed in the current contribution: (i) the database was not made public, limiting its impact for the biometric community; (ii) no commercial solutions were considered in the evaluation; (iii) little details were given about the 3D acquisition and the mask building process which were carried out by a third party and not self-manufactured. † Mask attacks have also been previously considered in the literature; however, in all of those preceding works, masks were manufactured from a third party leading in some cases to relatively cheap but not fully reliable reproductions obtained from 2D images and not from full 3D data [19] or to a very good but expensive masks [20] . The reproductions generated in this paper are a new type of self-manufactured low-cost accurate models produced using off-the-shelf technology. Such an approach entails a clear advantage for a potential attacker as he does not need to rely on external support. † A new gender-balanced face spoofing database containing 2D, 2.5D and 3D data, is released, contributing to similar past efforts in data acquisition. As in the case of past databases, this new dataset can have a deep impact in the development of face recognition robustness against spoofing. This is the biggest database of its kind acquired to date (i.e. containing 3D-spoofing attacks) and the only one considering two different 3D sensors, which can help to understand the impact of the acquisition device on the vulnerability of systems.
Experimental protocol
The experimental protocol has been designed to fulfil the main objective set in the present paper, that is, determining the risk posed by low-cost self-manufactured mask attacks to 3D and 2.5D face recognition technologies. To report as unbiased and meaningful results as possible the protocol includes: † Data: The new 3D-face spoofing database (3DFS-DB), which contains 3D, 2.5D and 2D real and spoofing data that allow performing a very wide range of different tests, including: vulnerability spoofing assessments of 2D, 2.5D and 3D face recognition technologies; 2D, 2.5D and 3D recognition performance evaluations; 3D interoperability assessment (as it is the first database to be acquired with two different 3D sensors). † Systems: Three different systems which include a commercial 3D solution and two proprietary implementations for 2.5D and 3D face recognition. † Experiments: To fully characterise the risk posed by the mask attacks contained in the 3DFS-DB, two performance evaluations under two different scenarios are carried out: (i) performance evaluation under the licit operation scenario and (ii) performance evaluation under the spoofing attack scenario.
All these three elements, database, systems and experiments are described in the following sections. Then, results are presented in Section 4.
3DFS database
The new 3DFS-DB has been constructed in order to comply with the requirements set for the experiments, that is: self-manufactured models using low-cost technology for 2D, 2.5D and 3D spoofing. The database is gender balanced and contains real and fake facial data of 26 subjects, 13 men and 13 women, all Caucasian between 25 and 55 years of age.
The 3DFS-DB is composed of two datasets of real (3DFS-REAL) and fake (3DFS-FAKE) data. Each dataset contains: (i) videos in '.avi' format for which both the 2D and 2.5D information are available and (ii) 3D models in '.stl' format. These data were acquired using two standard 3D scanners with a price of about 200$: the Microsoft Kinect (http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Kinect) and the PrimeSense Carmine 1.09 (http://www.en. wikipedia.org/wiki/PrimeSense). This is the first face spoofing database acquired with two different sensors, allowing therefore interoperability experiments. Both sensors contain a standard red, green and blue camera that captures 2D 640 × 480 pixel colour data and an infrared projection system which detects the depth in the picture (i.e. 2.5D data). Both sensors incorporate the light coding technology developed by the Israeli-based company PrimeSense (recently acquired by Apple); however, the Carmine 1.09 scanner has a shorter range of operation (between 0.3 and 1.5 m with respect to 0.8-4 m of the Kinect) which enables it to achieve a maximum depth resolution of about 0.5 mm compared with the 1 mm resolution of Kinect.
Both datasets, real and fake, were acquired in an office such as scenario with no specific illumination control and no constraints on the background, except that no moving objects were allowed.
Before the acquisition of the real dataset (3DFS-REAL), all users were informed of the nature of the experiments and the processing of their data and were invited to sign a consent form in compliance with the applicable EU data protection legislative framework (regulation (EC) no. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data). Then, data were acquired as follows: † Videos: The user sat in front of the sensor and 10 s videos were acquired at a rate of 30 frames per second (i.e. 300 frames per video). All samples are frontal with a neutral expression and only small movements were allowed during the video (i.e. blinking, breathing, slight head movements and so on) and a pause of about 1 min was left between videos. For each video, both the 2D colour data (640 × 480 pixel resolution) and the 2.5D depth information (640 × 480 pixel resolution and 1 mm depth resolution) were captured simultaneously. Videos were acquired using only the Microsoft Kinect scanner. † 3D models: The user sat in front of the sensor on a revolving chair fixed to the ground and rotated 180°from left to right at a regular speed with a neutral face expression. The 3D models were acquired using the 90$ license application Skanect (http://www. skanect.com) and saved in '.stl' format. For each user, five models were acquired with Kinect and five models with Carmine 1.09.
At the end of the real acquisition process, users were also registered using the Carmine 1.09 sensor in the commercial application LogOn from ArtecID for securing computer access (see Section 3.2 for further details). As explained later, this is a black-box-type application that does not allow accessing the enrolled features. Therefore it is just used for testing purposes and these data are not released with the rest of the database.
Once the 3DFS-REAL dataset was completed, the first 3D model of each user captured with the Carmine 1.09 scanner was manually processed and used to print one real size 3D reproduction of the subject's face. For this purpose, two non-professional 3D printers were used: the ShareBot Pro and the CubeX (http://www.sharebot. it and http://www.cubify.com), worth about 1000 and 2000 €, respectively. Acrylonitrile butadiene styrene plastic material was used to generate the physical artefacts as it resulted in better reproductions of the original models. The replicas were printed in natural size as, contrary to 2D recognition systems, 2.5D-and 3D-based algorithms are capable of detecting the objects real dimension, and therefore are robust to miniaturised reproductions [36] . All 26 printed models are shown in Fig. 4 .
In a subsequent stage, the 26 fake models were acquired to generate the 3DFS-FAKE dataset. The acquisition methodology and scenario were the same as the ones described for 3DFS-REAL except that, in this case, the attacker would hold in front of his face the victim's printed model. Therefore, for each user, the database contains: ten real and ten fake videos (all captured with Kinect) and ten real and ten fake 3D models (five captured with Kinect and five with Carmine 1.09). The general structure and generation process of the database is depicted in Fig. 2 , whereas some typical examples of the different data that may be found in each of the datasets are shown in Fig. 3 .
In Table 1 , we give a comparative overview of the main characteristics of the new 3DFS database and the two other existing databases in the state of the art containing 3D face spoofing artefacts. The 3DFS database presented here is the largest of its kind to date, including 26 subjects, and the only one available for research purposes which includes 2D, 2.5D and 3D data captured with two different sensors.
In compliance with the EU personal data protection regulation, only indirect access to the data is possible for research purposes on request to the authors (send email to: javier.galbally@jrc.ec. europa.eu). Such an indirect access implies that interested researchers are allowed to run their algorithms on the database remotely but not to download the data. It is envisaged that such access will be automatised in the future through the use of the new open source BEAT platform [42] .
Face recognition systems
Bear in mind that, as mentioned before, the objective of this paper is not to develop new and more precise face recognition systems but to evaluate their robustness to self-performed mask attacks. Therefore the goal is to provide reliable baseline results using reasonably accurate implementations of well-known solutions for face authentication. For this purpose, two proprietary implementations and a high-performing commercial system were considered in the experiments: † 2.5D proprietary implementation: The processing steps performed prior to the comparison of two 2.5D images are as follows: (i) face detection; (ii) nose tip detection; (iii) face segmentation and resizing to 60 × 60 pixels, forcing the nose tip to be in the centre of the image; (iv) eye detection; (v) face alignment rotating the image to force the line that connects the eyes to be horizontal; (vi) depth normalisation forcing the nose tip (i.e. closest point of the size-normalised face to the sensor) to a 0 depth value. Finally, the similarity scores between two normalised 2.5D faces are computed as the average Euclidean distance between all the pixels. † 3D proprietary implementation: The system carries out the next preprocessing steps before computing the similarity scores between two 3D models: (i) head detection; (ii) head segmentation from the rest of the body; (iii) head rotation so that the eyes are aligned with the x-axis; (4) face segmentation from the rest of the head; and (v) face normalisation forcing the nose tip to be at point (0, 0, 0). The similarity score between two normalised 3D face models is computed as the Hausdorff distance [43, 44] . This distance measures how far two subsets (not necessarily composed of the same number of points) are from each other within a given metric space (in our case a 3D space). In brief, two sets are close according to the Hausdorff distance if every point of either set is close to some point of the other set. The Hausdorff metric has already been successfully used in previous works to compare 2D images [45] , 3D meshes [46] and in 3D face recognition [47] [48] [49] [50] , showing a remarkable performance in the face recognition grand challenge [51, 52] . † 3D commercial: ArtecID 3D face LogOn: This is a 3D face recognition system commercialised by ArtecID (http://www.artecid. com/), designed to be integrated primarily on personal computers and laptops as a method to securely sign-in in environments where restricted access is required, such as financial, governmental, medical or forensic applications [53] . The software may work both on verification and identification modes and is specifically built to be compatible with the PrimeSense Carmine 1.09 sensor. Being a commercial product, it is distributed as a black box and no description of the algorithms running inside is given, only specifying that it is based on 3D face recognition. The output score is a similarity percentage (i.e. ranging from 0 to 100) between the enrolled model and the test sample.
Some typical real and fake processed 2.5D images and 3D models are shown in Figs. 4 and 5. These are the types of processed samples used by the self-developed systems described above for authentication purposes. The processed files are available together with the raw data (For further details on the protocol to use the data please contact: javier.galbally@jrc.ec.europa.eu.) so that, if necessary, the protocol followed in this work may be fully reproduced.
Experiments
Several new variables and evaluations are involved when the spoofing dimension is introduced. As such, defining a clear methodology and its associated metrics to assess the 'spoofability' of biometric systems is not a straight forward problem. Although it is not yet generally deployed, an evaluation protocol which is gaining popularity for the assessment of biometric spoofing defines two possible working scenarios [19, [54] [55] [56] : Fig. 3 Typical data samples that may be found in the 3DFS-DB KN stands for data acquired with the Kinect scanner, whereas CR stands for data acquired with the Carmine 1.09 scanner. See Section 3.1 and Fig. 2 for further details about the structure and acquisition of the database 5 † Licit scenario: This is the scenario considered in classic performance evaluations. It only takes into account genuine access attempts (i.e. regular access attempt, in which a user logs in as himself) and zero-effort impostor access attempts (i.e. access attempts, in which the attacker uses his own real biometric trait but claims to be a different user). In this scenario, performance is typically reported in terms of the false rejection rate (FRR, number of genuine access attempts wrongly rejected) and the false acceptance rate (FAR, number of zero-effort impostor access attempts wrongly accepted). The working point where both the FRR and the FAR take the same value is the equal error rate (EER) and is generally accepted as a good estimation of the overall performance of the system. † Spoofing scenario: In this scenario, access attempts are either genuine (defined as before) or spoofing attacks where the intruder uses a physical artefact (in our case, a 3D printed model) to impersonate the original user. Although for this last scenario, there is still no agreed and standard way of reporting results, two metrics which have been proposed and are starting to be widely used are the FRR (defined as in the licit scenario) and the spoofing FAR (SFAR), corresponding to the number of spoofing attacks wrongly accepted). The point where the FRR is equal to the SFAR is referred to in this work as the spoofing EER (SEER).
In [56] , Chingovska et al. discuss on the use of the SEER as a metric to report a system's vulnerability to a specific spoofing attack. Their compelling argument to propose alternative measures is that biometric systems are normally tuned to give top performance in the licit scenario (not in the spoofing scenario). Therefore a more accurate method to estimate their resilience to spoofing is to give the SFAR value at specific operating points (i.e. decision thresholds) in the licit scenario. For instance, rather than directly comparing the EER and the SEER, a better practice is to compare the EER and the SFAR at the EER threshold (referred in the present paper as SFAR EER ). In the present paper, we follow this trend of reporting spoofing vulnerability. For visualisation purposes, Fig. 6 shows the visual interpretation of the SFAR at the EER threshold. The score distributions (a) and their respective detection error trade-off (DET) curves (b) correspond to the tests performed on the commercial system ArtecID 3D Face LogOn.
All three metrics (i.e. FRR, FAR and SFAR) allow objectively determining the loss of performance between the two scenarios (i.e. licit and spoofing). Their correct assessment is required to determine the real threat posed by a given spoofing database. Strictly speaking, the protocol followed to evaluate these parameters should include a training set, used to fix the decision threshold, and a test set, used to report the final unbiased results. Unfortunately, in the present study, because of the limited amount of data available, such a protocol would entail a loss of statistical significance of the results, as well as reducing the number of attacked users. Given that the main objective of this paper is to assess the vulnerability to spoofing, we believe that it is acceptable to use all subjects in the database for training and testing, even if that produces slightly optimistic performance results. However, readers should be aware of that particular limitation of the protocol followed, forced by the size of the database. 5 Real and fake examples of 2.5D and 3D processed data generated by the self-developed recognition systems for authentication purposes Fig. 6 Graphic showing the methodology followed in the present work to report spoofing vulnerability As introduced in [56] , vulnerability results are presented in terms of the SFAR at the EER threshold a Score distributions b Respective DET curves corresponding to the tests performed on the commercial system ArtecID 3D Face LogOn. The figure is inspired by a similar plot in [56] For each of the systems considered in the experiments and described in Section 3.2, the three sets of scores (i.e. genuine scores, zero-effort impostor scores and spoofing impostor scores) required to obtain the FRR, FAR and SFAR, were computed as follows: † 2.5D proprietary system: Each user was enrolled using five equally spaced processed frames from his first video. The remaining four real videos were used for testing, and for each of them five equally spaced processed frames were selected, totalling 40 test images per user. 'Genuine scores' were computed comparing each of the 40 test samples to the five enrolled images of the same user. The final score is the average of the five partial scores between the test sample and the enrolled images. Therefore a total of 26 × 40 = 1040 genuine scores were generated. 'Zero-effort impostor scores' were computed matching five randomly selected test samples of the remaining 25 users to the enrolled images of the user at hand, giving a total of 26 × 25 × 5 = 3250 zero-effort impostor scores. Finally, to compute the 'spoofing impostor scores' all five fake videos were used for testing, selecting five equally spaced frames from each of them. Then, spoofing impostor scores were computed matching all 50 test spoofing samples of a given user to the five enrolled images of that same subject, resulting in 26 × 50 = 1300 spoofing impostor scores.
To have a fully reproducible protocol, the enrolled and test samples used in the 2.5D spoofing experiments are also available with the 3DFS database (For further details on the protocol to use the data please contact: javier.galbally@jrc.ec.europa.eu.). † 3D proprietary system: The same protocol was used for the models produced with the Kinect and the Carmine 1.09 sensors. 'Genuine scores' were computed using successively all five processed 3D face models for enrollment, and testing with the remaining four models avoiding duplicated matchings (i.e. A against B and B against A), leading this way to 26 × (4 + 3 + 2 + 1) = 260 genuine scores. 'Zero-effort impostor scores' were computed matching the first model from the 25 remaining users to the first model of the enrolled subject, that is, 26 × 25 = 650 zero-effort impostor scores. 'Spoofing impostor scores' were generated matching all five fake samples of the enrolled user to all five real models, resulting in 26 × 5 × 5 = 650 spoofing impostor scores. † 3D commercial: ArtecID 3D Face LogOn: As this is a black-box system, it allows far less flexibility than the previous two algorithms. All 26 users were enrolled to the system. To compute the 'genuine scores', each of them was asked to access his account five times, giving 26 × 5 = 130 genuine scores. To generate the 'zero-effort impostor scores', each user was asked to try to access the accounts of five different subjects, leading to 26 × 5 = 130 zero-effort impostor scores. Finally, 'spoofing impostor scores' were computed using the fake reproductions to try to access five times the account of the genuine user, obtaining again 26 × 5 = 130 spoofing impostor scores.
Results
The experimental protocol described in Section 3 allows us to objectively compare the performance of 2.5D and 3D face recognition systems in the licit and spoofing scenarios. This way we can fully characterise the risk posed by the studied self-manufactured low-cost mask attacks.
The distributions of the three sets of scores, genuine, zero-effort impostor and spoofing impostor, for each of the systems considered in the experiments are shown in Fig. 7 . It may be observed that the spoofing impostor attempts distribution is closer to the genuine scores than that from the zero-effort accesses, which means that fake reproductions are more prone to be mistaken with real users and, therefore, to break the systems.
These sets of scores are used to compute the metrics FRR-FAR in the licit scenario and FRR-SFAR in the spoofing case. Each of these two metric tuples is plotted in the form of DET curves in Fig. 8 , so that the performance of the systems may be visually compared in the two working scenarios. For each of the charts, the x-axis represents either the FAR or the SFAR depending on the scenario selected (licit or spoofing).
Following the process graphically explained in Fig. 6 , the DET curves in Fig. 8 are used as the basis for the quantitative comparison presented in Table 2 . As explained in Section 3.3, Table 2 reports the spoofing vulnerability of the tested systems in Fig. 7 Distributions of the genuine, zero-effort impostor and spoofing impostor sets of scores, for the three systems considered in the experiments Graphical example of how to interpret these plots may be seen in Fig. 6a Fig. 8 DET curves for the two considered scenarios, licit and spoofing, and for the three systems used in the experiments x-axis shows the FAR or the SFAR depending on the scenario. The SEER is just given for reference. A graphical example of how to interpret these plots may be seen in Fig. 6b terms of the SFAR at two representative operating points of the licit scenario: the EER point (SFAR EER ) and a high security point with FAR = 0.1% (SFAR 01 ).
Several interesting conclusions may be extracted from the results shown in Table 2 and Fig. 8 : † Regarding the licit scenario results, it may be observed that the performance of the proprietary systems considered in this paper, based only on the face geometry/shape, is still a step behind that of top-ranked 2D face recognition systems under good acquisition conditions (i.e. controlled illumination, pose and background). This corroborates the results obtained in past independent competitions [51] , and shows that, in spite of the obvious advances in terms of size and price, off-the-shelf 3D sensing technology still needs to improve its accuracy to reach really competitive recognition results in the field of face authentication. † Also worth noting that, in the licit scenario, the higher resolution of the Carmine 1.09 sensor with respect to Kinect translates into better performance, decreasing the EER from 9.9 to 8.4%. † Interestingly, the 2.5D recognition system reaches an accuracy (EER = 9.3%) fully comparable with the system based on the complete face 3D model (EER = 9.1%). This may be explained by the fact that, in the experiments, the 2.5D algorithm uses five images for enrolment and averages all five scores obtained from the matching to the test image, whereas the 3D system considers only one enrolled model. Therefore a direct comparison between the performance of both systems is difficult to be established. † Clearly, the most competitive system is the commercial solution, with an EER of 1.6%, comparable with that of top state-of-the-art systems. However, this system is also by far the most vulnerable to the tested attack, decreasing its security level from EER = 1.6% to SFAR EER = 92.3%, about 60 times higher. In the case of the proprietary systems such increase is from EER≃9.5% to SFAR EER ≃40.0%. This fact shows that the spoofing vulnerability studied in this paper does not only affect low-performing systems but also highly accurate commercial solutions. † The previous observation is confirmed by the vulnerability results achieved at the higher security operating point FAR = 0.1%. Once more, in this case the highest vulnerable system is the commercial solution, with an SFAR 01 = 56.6% (again an increase by a factor of about 60), whereas the proprietary systems are able to present an SFAR 01 below 20% in all cases. Such results suggest that performance and vulnerability are not two linked concepts and that high-performance systems are not necessarily the ones that offer the highest security against attacks. † Overall, results presented in Table 2 show the high vulnerability of all tested systems, even the commercial solution, to the proposed attack. On average, there is an increase of about 450% between the EER and the SFAR EER for the different algorithms evaluated. The increase of the vulnerability to attacks is similar even for a high security operating point such as FAR = 0.1%.
Conclusions
Face recognition systems based on 3D data are usually regarded as robust to classical spoofing attacks typically carried out with 2D surfaces such as printed photographs or screens of portable devices. However, 3D face recognition technology may fail the challenge posed by more sophisticated type of attacks based on the presentation of a 3D face reproduction to the acquisition sensor.
This work has presented the first vulnerability evaluations of 2.5D and 3D face recognition systems to spoofing attacks performed with low-cost self-manufactured face models. Experiments have been carried out on a new database, the biggest of this type acquired to date (i.e. considering 3D face spoofing attacks), which will be made available for researchers. Results have been obtained following a fully reproducible protocol and they have been reported based on metrics, which in the absence of a standardised way of assessing biometric 'spoofability', are the most widely used methodology to present the outcome of a spoofing study in a meaningful and usable way.
Although the statistical significance of the study is limited because of the relatively small amount of data considered (i.e. 26 subjects), we believe that, from a qualitative point of view, the results show the high vulnerability of the assessed systems, including the commercial solution evaluated, to this type of threat. Even if results could vary from a quantitative perspective on a larger database, the work may still be seen as a consistent and reliable proof of concept of the studied attack. Furthermore, in spite of its limited size, the database almost doubles the size of other previously published works on 3D face spoofing [19, 20] .
The risk posed by the attacks is even greater considering the 'do-it-yourself' nature of the study, which makes them accessible to the general public with no intervention from third parties and with a very limited budget. Therefore the work has raised the need to develop adequate countermeasures against this potential security breach.
Such countermeasures may be based, in general, on the extraction from the presented trait (real or fake) of additional information to the 3D data, and could include: the use of face specific motion cues such as lip movement or blinking [57, 58] (although such solutions could be potentially overcome by making adequate holes in the fake model); the use of colour-based or image quality-based features [59] , given that the reproductions built in the experiments are monochromatic (real-colour models can be obtained with professional 3D printers; however, the price of such devices is still very high and would not fit the low-cost objective of the present study); the use of other 2D local features such as the very popular local binary patterns [60, 61] , which have already been tested against mask attacks in a preliminary study [35] ; the use of hardware-based liveness detection solutions measuring for instance the reflectance of fake models and real faces [62] . The systematic and rigorous evaluation of such (or other) countermeasures would constitute a complete research work on its own which would exceed the scope of the present study.
In summary, the current study may be understood as a consistent and rigorous practical example which shows that although a great amount of work has been done and many advances have been reached in the field of spoofing detection, attacking methodologies have also evolved and become more sophisticated. This way, there are still big challenges to be faced in the protection against spoofing that will hopefully lead in the coming years to a whole new generation of more secure biometric systems. Graphical example on the meaning of the two metrics (i.e. SFAR EER and SFAR 01 ) may be found inFig. 6. The EER of each system is also given for reference
